Re: [ALSC-Forum] Evaluation of NAIS and ALSC Reports

[Jeff Williams]

Leah and all stakeholders or interested parties,

L Gallegos wrote:

> Well stated, Sandy.  Now, how do we, the majority, get the
> minority (ICANN board) to do it.  All signs are that they will do as
> they have always done - ignore the bylaws or change them to
> reflect what the special interests want.  How do we change that
> when we are NOT represented and ICANN answers to no one?
> DoC will do whatever ICANN wants.

  Simple and blunt answer is:  By any and all means necessary.
DOC may not like that.  But it must be done!

>
>
> It is this illegitmacy and imbalance that is the problem - the core
> problem.

  Indeed it is!

>
>
> Leah
>
> On 7 Sep 2001, at 13:41, Sandy Harris wrote:
>
> >
> > Joe Sims wrote:
> > >
> > > PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ICANN - THE AT LARGE DEBATE
> > >
> > > Joe Sims*
> > >
> > > * What follows is a personal evaluation of these documents. ... I
> > > hope it will contribute to the ongoing dialog.
> >
> > So here's a personal response.
> >
> > > INTRODUCTION
> > >
> > > One of the important remaining issues relating to ICANN's
> > > organization is how to achieve an appropriate level of public
> > > participation in ICANN
> >
> > Yes, indeed.
> >
> > > without impairing its ability to effectively carry out its principal
> > > mission - to preserve the operational stability of the Domain Name
> > > System.
> >
> > I don't like this qualification you've added here. Preserving
> > stability is not ICANN's principal mission. It is certainly part of
> > the mission, but no more so than instigating change in the system, or
> > than ensuring that the administration of the system is somehow
> > accountable to its users.
> >
> > > While there is little disagreement on the concept of public
> > > participation, the type and approach have been vigorously debated
> > > since before ICANN's creation.
> >
> > Yes.
> >
> > > In 2000, ICANN failed to find a consensus position after
> > > considerable effort, and fell back to a temporary compromise - the
> > > direct election of an ICANN Board member from each of five
> > > geographic regions, and the establishment of a blue ribbon At Large
> > > Study Committee (ALSC), headed by the former Prime Minister of
> > > Sweden Carl Bildt, to seek a final resolution that could achieve
> > > consensus support throughout the ICANN community.
> >
> > That's not at all how I'd describe the history.
> >
> > In the controversy around Stuart Lynn's recent discussion paper on
> > alternate roots, ICANN management (quite correctly in my view) claimed
> > that principles set out in the White Paper and elsewhere were part of
> > ICANN's mandate, and should be treated as part of existing policy.
> >
> > As I see it, the notion of nine At Large directors is another such
> > case.
> >
> > See, for example Dyson's 1998 letter assuring IANA of ICANN's
> > excellent intentions:
> >
> > http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/press/ICANN111098.htm
> >
> > " ... elect the nine At Large Directors. ... the Board has an
> > unconditional
> >     mandate to create a membership structure that will elect the At
> >     Large Directors of the Board
> >
> > " ... the Board, which will consist of the elected representatives of
> > the
> >       entire Internet community
> >
> > " Esther Dyson
> > " Interim Chairman
> > " On Behalf of the ICANN Board
> >
> > And the actual Bylaws attached to that letter have, in Article 9:
> >
> > " Each Board after the Initial Board shall be comprised as follows: "
> > "   (i) Three (3) Directors nominated by the Address Supporting
> > Organization ... "  (ii) Three (3) Directors nominated by the Domain
> > Name Supporting Organization,... " (iii) Three (3) Directors nominated
> > by the Protocol Supporting Organization ... "  (iv) Nine  (9) At Large
> > Directors, ... "   (v) The ... President of the Corporation.
> >
> > This as much a part of the ICANN mandate as the "there can be only
> > one" notion about roots that Lynn referred to.
> >
> > Methinks the mandate for ALSC is in the bylaws, Article 9:
> >
> > " (c) At Large Board members ... shall be elected by a process to be
> > determined " ... Such process shall call for election of At Large
> > directors by one or more " categories of members of the Corporation
> > ...
> >
> > The problem here is to determine how to elect nine directors. To do
> > that, you likely have to define "members of the Corporation". Ask
> > Auerbach about that :-)
> >
> > I don't think the question of reducing the number of At Large
> > directors should have arisen, either in the ALSC or the on Board. the
> > Board's mandate is to implement the bylaws, not to subvert them.
> >
> > The only time I think the question of changing the number of At Large
> > directors should come up is if other changes in the Board are made.
> > e.g. If a new CCSO is formed and gets seats, I'd say we need to do
> > something to maintain balance. Either 4 SOs with two seats each = 8
> > and keep the nine At Large, or keep the three seats per SO and
> > increase to 12 At Large.
> >
> > > ... The 2000 election had many flaws, ... It is not at all clear
> > > that even a massive outreach effort would produce a meaningful
> > > increase in the level of real interest in ICANN and its activities.
> >
> > True.
> >
> > > The NAIS recommendations seem to completely ignore these research
> > > results. They call for regional and global elections of half the
> > > ICANN Board, with the electorate made up of all "interested" humans,
> >
> > As I see it, having half the board openly elected is mandated by the
> > bylaws. The question is not whether to do this, but how.
> >
> > There is some room to manouvre. The bylaws say the voters should be
> > "one or more categories of members of the Corporation", so we need to
> > define "members" in some way that allows anyone interested to "join".
> >
> > Subscription to the relevant mailing lists would be a reasonable
> > defintion, except that the language barrier excludes many and there is
> > potential for fraud of several sorts. Perhaps we should work on those
> > problems.
> >
> > > and suggest using the same approaches that the evaluations concluded
> > > were seriously flawed.
> >
> > Yes, we need a better method.
> >
> > > ... While conceding that their recommendations do
> > > not enjoy consensus support, the NAIS study nevertheless asserts
> > > that they represent the only way for ICANN to gain what NAIS calls
> > > "legitimacy," although exactly what NAIS intends that to mean is not
> > > clear.
> >
> > I'd have thought this should be obvious, but I'll spell it out.
> >
> > If ICANN is to credibly claim to respresent the interests of Internet
> > users, there must be some role for those users in determing ICANN
> > policy. Half the Board seats is a bare minimum. Anything less gives
> > various special interests a clear majority.
> >
> > > ... an organization whose primary responsibility is maintaining the
> > > stability of the DNS.
> >
> > See my first comment above.
> >
> > > The ALSC draft report ... While there are a number of serious
> > > potential flaws in the ALSC approach,
> >
> > There is one fundamental flaw, the suggestion of reducing the number
> > of At Large directors. This does nothing to solve the difficulties of
> > running elections or defining ICANN membership. Those problems as as
> > hard for six directors as for nine. All it does is implement an
> > unconscionable shift in the board balance.
> >
> > > it is a serious and credible proposal by an independent body that
> > > appears to have taken seriously its instructions to do a "clean
> > > sheet" study and to try to produce an approach that could gain
> > > consensus.
> >
> > Yes.
> >
> > > The most interesting part of the Markle survey for these purposes
> > > was the fact that not a single person in any of the diverse focus
> > > groups surveyed had ever heard of ICANN, and only about half of the
> > > "Internet experts" could identify ICANN.
> >
> > Interesting indeed.
> >
> > > This broad and statistical affirmation of what to many seems
> > > intuitively obvious -- that the apparent "public" interest in ICANN
> > > is actually only the intense (and loudly expressed) interest of
> > > several dozen academics and policy activists
> >
> > Touche. However, without them you'd have only corporate players, ICANN
> > staff and lawyers, representatives of various governments, and a few
> > miscellaneous folk. None of those have any credible claim to represent
> > the public interest either.
> >
> > > ... a key question in the debate over public participation in ICANN:
> > > how much of the debate today truly reflects the public interest, and
> > > how much reflects the personal and institutional agendas of the
> > > proponents, ...
> >
> > Good question, but no possible answer to it would change the necessity
> > that the public interest somehow be represented, or the fact that the
> > bylaws require nine elected At Large directors.
> >
> > > The NAIS report, ... recognizes that "there is far from a broad
> > > consensus about ICANN's proper role, and there is even greater
> > > variation of opinion about the best way that public representation
> > > can keep ICANN on the right course (or whether there is any role for
> > > public representation at all)."
> >
> > A reasonable statement.
> >
> > > (p.90) But the NAIS authors then assert that the only possible
> > > solution to the problem is one that has already been demonstrated to
> > > lack consensus support. In a consensus development organization,
> > > where it will take a 2/3 vote of the existing Board to adopt any
> > > solution, this seems an odd way to advance your objectives.
> >
> > Again, this is much like Lynn's alternate roots paper. We don't need
> > to have the Board make new policy here. We need to have them implement
> > existing policy by getting nine At large directors seated.
> >
> > > The NAIS report documents, in its regional analyses of the previous
> > > At Large election, significant executional problems.
> >
> > Yes.
> >
> > > The NAIS report clearly began with an assumed premise -- all
> > > interested individuals should have a voice in ICANN.
> >
> > Seems a valid premise to me.
> >
> > > It then proceeds to the conclusion that the only way this could
> > > appropriately happen is to hold direct elections of all interested
> > > humans on the globe for half the seats on the ICANN Board. ... How
> > > it gets from "a voice" to "elect half the Board, no matter how much
> > > it costs or how hard it is to do" is never clearly explained.
> >
> > The notion that half the seats on the Board is an appropriate way to
> > provide the necessary public voice does not come from NAIS. It comes
> > straight out of the bylaws, presumably arrived at through some form of
> > consensus/compromise process.
> >
> > As for elections, what alternate mechanisms are there?
> >
> > We might look at the notion of creating a constituency for public
> > interest groups like EFF and giving it half the board seats. That
> > proposal has some merit, but it is far from clear that it would be
> > either workable or equitable.
> >
> > Or we could ask national governments or ccTLD administrations to run
> > local elections for some sort of assembly or electoral college that
> > could then elect Board members. I'm not sure that proposal has any
> > merit at all.
> >
> > I cannot think of any other mechanisms to propose here that are even
> > vaguely plausible. Anyone else?
> >
> > So I think we're stuck with some sort of election. The question is how
> > to do that.
> >

Regards,

--
Jeffrey A. Williams
Spokesman for INEGroup - (Over 118k members strong!)
CEO/DIR. Internet Network Eng/SR. Java/CORBA Development Eng.
Information Network Eng. Group. INEG. INC.
E-Mail jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
Contact Number:  972-447-1800 x1894 or 214-244-4827
Address: 5 East Kirkwood Blvd. Grapevine Texas 75208